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I ARTICLES I
Forced Displacement in the Former
Yugoslavia: A Crime Under
International Law?
Michael P. Roch*
Wer vor fremdem Druck flieht order durch ihn vertrieben wird,
ist aller Sicherungen ledig. Er rettet nur das nackte Leben. -
Theodor Heuss'
I. Introduction
In the past several years, the global community has had the
dubious privilege of witnessing many on-going conflicts in which
one group of individuals forcibly displaces another group from
allegedly disputed territories. In 1994, about eighteen million
refugees were forced to leave their patriae, and about 24 million
* Michael P. Roch, C.P.A., Juris Doctor expected May, 1996, University of
Denver College of Law; Master of Accountancy, 1991, University of Denver
School of Accountancy. Prior to attending law school, Mr. Roch practiced
management and privatization consulting in Slovenia.
1. "He who flees from foreign pressure, or who is displaced because of it, is
divorced from all security and safety. He only saves his naked life." Theodor
Heuss, Bundesprasident of the Federal Republic of Germany (1949-1959),
Wegweiser far Heimatvertriebene, Nov. 1955 (in Bundesinnenministerium fur
Vertriebene, Fltlchtlinge und Kriegsgeschadigte, 10 JAHRE NACH DER VERT-
REIBUNG: AUBERUNGEN DES IN- UND AUSLANDES UND EINE ZEITrAFEL 3 (1956)
[hereinafter 10 JAHRE NACH DER VERTREIBUNG]. All foreign language texts used
in this article are translated by the author unless indicated otherwise.
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more were driven from their homes but did not leave their home
country.
2
For instance, the conflict within Angola, which began after
Angola's independence from Portugal in 1975, has displaced about
three million Angolans.3 During the past ten years, more than
500,000 Colombians have fled their homes in fear of persecution by
their own government's militia.4 Iraq relocated many Kuwaitis to
Iraq during the Persian Gulf conflict.' Civil strife in Burma has
caused the forced relocation and displacement of civilians during an
on-going conflict.6 By the end of 1994, the Tutsi minority in
Rwanda had been cut in half, mostly through flight effected by the
Hutus.7 As of February, 1995, about 420,000 Chechnyans have
2. See Vitat Muntarbhorn, 'Prevention' as Key to the Refugee Problem,
BANGKOK POST, Feb. 15, 1994, available in Westlaw, INT-NEWS Database;
Report of Jacques Quenod on Refugees, Displaced Persons and Returnees, U.N.
ESCOR, 2d Sess., 37th plen. mtg., para. 10, U.N. Doc. E/1991/109/Add.1 (1991)
(cited in Maria Stavropoulou, The Right Not To Be Displaced, 9 AM. U.J. INT'L
L. & POL'Y 689 (1994)).
3. Mario Paiva, Angola May Talk to UNITA on Peace, REUTER NEWSWIRE,
Nov. 3, 1993, available in LEXIS, News Library, ARCNWS File. Since a new
flareup in 1991, the conflict has claimed about 1,000 lives daily. Id. .See also
Frieden in Angola wieder fraglich: Luanda meldet Eroberung Huambos - NITA
und internationale Heifer widersprechen der Regierung, SODDEUTSCHE ZEITUNG,
Nov. 8, 1994; available in LEXIS, World Library, NEWS File.
4. Gilles Castonguay, Half-million Refugees Flee Columbia, REUTER
NEWSWIRE, Oct. 11, 1994, available in LEXIS, News Library, CURNWS File.
5. United States: Department of Defense Report to Congress on the
Conduct of the Persian Gulf War - Appendix on the Role of the Law of War, 31
I.L.M. 612 (1992).
6. Thailand: Git Mon Incident Should Serve as Reminder in Handling Latest
Flood of Refugees, BANGKOK POST, Jan. 29, 1995, available in Westlaw, INT-
NEWS Database; Burma: A Sad Day for Burmese Democracy Movement and its
People, BANGKOK POST, Mar. 13, 1994, available in Westlaw, INT-NEWS
Database.
7. Rudolph Chimelli, Grojimacht-Akkorde beim Disengagement. Frankreichs
Prasident Franqois Mitterand vor seinem Staatsbesuch in Suidafrika, SODDEUTSCHE
ZEITUNG, July 4, 1994, available in, LEXIS, World Library, NEWS File. Of those,
about 500,000 to 1,000,000 Tutsi have been systematically murdered. UNO-
Kommission bestatigt: Systematischer Mord an Tutsi. Internationales Tribunal soil
den Genozid ahnden. SODDEUTSCHE ZEITUNG, Oct. 5, 1994, available in LEXIS,
World Library, NEWS File; Alan Nichols, Rwanda: Why the World Must not Let
Go of Rwanda, AUSTL. FIN. REV., Aug. 12, 1994.
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become refugees.' As recently as March, 1995, the United Nations
has condemned Sudan for forcibly displacing individuals.9
In addition, more than three million Bosnians have been
displaced as a result of Serb efforts.10 These efforts began about
six months after Bosnia-Hercegovina declared independence from
the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (hereinafter Former
Yugoslavia) on October 15, 1991.1" Bosnia-Hercegovina's declara-
tion followed Slovenia's December 23, 1990, independence
declaration, subsequent to which a brief period of fighting broke
out in Slovenia. Slovenia achieved peace around July 5, 1991,12
but Bosnia-Hercegovina did not escape prolonged war as easily as
did Slovenia. Despite the fact that the new government of Bosnia-
Hercegovina asked all Yugoslav National Army forces to leave
Bosnia-Hercegovina on February 24, 1992, the Army had already
transferred a massive amount of military artillery to the Bosnian-
Serb fighters. 3 On April 6, 1992, the European Union recognized
Bosnia-Hercegovina under intense pressure from Germany. Today,
8. Anklage wegen Landesverrats und Aufrufs zu Terrorakten Russland erlaijt
Haftbefehl gegen Prdsident Dudajew. Kampfe in Tschetschenien gehen unvermind-
ert weiter / Nachbarrepublik Inguschien beftirchtet Ausweitung des Krieges,
SODDEUTSCHE ZEITUNG, Feb. 2, 1995, available in LEXIS, World Library, NEWS
File.
9. U.N. Slams Sudan for Slavery and Torture, REUTER NEWSWIRE, Mar. 8,
1995, available in LEXIS, News Library, CURNWS File.
10. See Human Rights Watch, I-II WAR CRIMES IN BOSNIA: A HELSINKI
WATCH REPORT (1993) [hereinafter HELSINKI WATCH]; Marc Weller, Current
Development: The International Response to the Dissolution of the Socialist Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia, 86 A.J.I.L. 569 (1992).
While many sources refer to such forced displacement as "ethnic cleansing,"
this author prefers to abstain from this term's use as the Serbs themselves have
coined the euphemism "ethnic cleansing" to describe the forced deportation of
Muslim inhabitants of certain parts of Bosnia. See, e.g., ROY GUTMAN, A
WITNESS TO GENOCIDE vii (1993) (a compilation of a reporter's accounts during
his visits to the Former Yugoslavia during the early years of the conflict). This
author does not wish to legitimize such activities by using the Serb term just as he
does not want to belittle the Jewish Holocaust by using the National-socialistic
terms of "Endl6sung" or "Euthanasie" when referring to Germany's atrocities
before and during World War II.
11. The historical reasons for this conflict are complex and intricate. For a
more detailed historical analysis, see ROBERT D. KAPLAN, BALKAN GHOSTS: A
JOURNEY THROUGH HISTORY (1993); Michael P. Roch, Military Intervention in
Bosnia-Hercegovina: Will World Politics Prevail Over the Rule of International
Law?, 24 DEN. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y (forthcoming Jan. 1996).
12. The exact date is in dispute. See Weller, supra note 10, at 573.
13. Id. at 585-597. Before the breakup of the Former Yugoslavia, the
Yugoslav National Army represented the fifth largest army in the world. For the
military capacities of the Yugoslav National Army, see YUGOSLAVIA: A COUNTRY
STUDY (Glenn E. Curtis ed., 1990).
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four years after the fighting began in Bosnia-Hercegovina, the
bloodshed continues; nearly three-fourths of Bosnia-Hercegovina's
pre-war population have become refugees due to the vast amount
of human rights violations committed on the Bosnian-Muslim
population by the Bosnian-Serbs.
14
This war is especially tragic because it appears to have come
at the wrong time, namely during a period of "compassion fatigue"
for the disadvantaged. 5 During favorable economic times of the
post-World War Two period, nations have come together in an
effort to protect refugees through international documents. 6
Some nations even have found the benevolence to take in those
displaced by ethnic strife and economic hardship, often having
exceeded their responsibilities under the Refugee Convention and
Protocol.17  As commercial competition among nations has
become more fierce, even the most accommodating nations have
begun to balk at the costs of caring for refugees; 8 this trend has
caused many nations to change their refugee laws in order to
restrict the influx of asylum seekers. 9
In order to reduce costs related to refugee management,
nations have become less willing to accommodate large numbers of
refugees but have instead focused on how to prevent refugee flows.
One such prevention tool is to bring to justice those individuals
who forcibly displace groups of people in order to deter future
criminals and world leaders from repeating their predecessors'
atrocities. One recent series of such efforts is the establishment of
ad hoc international criminal tribunals which seek to try and punish
individuals who have committed certain atrocities in the Former
Yugoslavia and in Rwanda.
14. Roch, supra note 11.
15. See Carolyn Waller, Confronting the Challenge of Realizing Human Rights
Now: II. Refugees and Asylum in the United States: United States Asylum Law, 34
How. L.J. 61 (1991).
16. See infra Refugee Convention and Protocol, notes 134-35.
17. The constitution of the Federal Republic of Germany, for instance,
embodies the right of asylum to those who are politically persecuted. Grundgesetz
of the Federal Republic of Germany of May 23, 1949, art. 16 (1949), before its
amendment of June 28, 1993, per the Gesetz zur Anderung des Grundgesetzes
(Artikel 16 und 18), 1993 BGBI. I S. 1102 [Law on the Change of the Basic Law
for arts. 16 and 18, as published in the Federal Gazette (1993)].
18. See Weiter Streit um Kosten fir Fluichtlinge, SODDEUTSCHE ZEITUNG, Jan.
26, 1995, available in LEXIS, World Library, NEWS File. Germany has
appropriated DM 400 million to provide humanitarian services to Bosnian asylees;
the German portion of aid to Rwanda amounts to about DM 230 million. Id.
19. Gesetz zurAnderung des Grundgesetzes (Artikel 16 und 18), supra note 17.
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Most writers in this field appear to have focused their efforts
on how these atrocities constitute crimes of genocide or fall within
the definition of some other crime against humanity.2' This
article, however, focuses specifically on how international criminal
law punishes those who have forcibly displaced groups of people,21
using various methods in pursuit of ulterior motives, such as
territorial gain, as is the case in the Former Yugoslavia.22
To accomplish this objective,' this article first briefly defines
two types of forced displacement.24 The article then focuses on
forced displacement of groups of people as a crime under interna-
tional criminal law, taking into consideration the differences in
approach depending on whether the conflict is of international or
civil nature.2  Last, this article analyzes the applicability of
various treaties with respect to forced displacement under interna-
tional criminal law,26 followed by conclusions and observations.
2 7
II. Forced Displacement: Intent or Effect?
Before commencing an analysis of forced displacement under
international criminal law, it is important to define the meaning of
forced displacement within the context of this article. Is an
individual "displaced" when the circumstances of civil strife cause
him to leave his residence, or is he only "forcibly removed" once
members of an army physically move him onto a bus and cart him
away?
20. See Jordan J. Paust, Applicability of International Criminal Laws to Events
in the Former Yugoslavia, 9 AM. U.J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 499 (1994); Elizabeth L.
Pearl, Punishing Balkan War Criminals: Could the End of Yugoslavia Provide an
End to Victor's Justice?, 30 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1373 (1993); John Webb, Genocide
Treaty - Ethnic Cleansing - Substantive and Procedural Hurdles in the
Application of the Genocide Convention to Alleged Crimes in the Former
Yugoslavia, 23 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 377 (1993).
21. See infra part II.
22. For further reference, see Jean-Marie Henckaerts, Deportation and
Transfer of Civilians in Time of War, 26 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 469 (1993).
23. Twenty years ago, Alfred M. de Zayas provided a similar model for
analysis of forced migration under international criminal law. See Alfred M. de
Zayas, International Law and Mass Population Transfers, 16 HARV. INT'L L.J. 207,
209 (1975). De Zayas' model has been used in subsequent and recent analyses.
See also Stavropoulou, supra note 2, at 718 et seq. This author has adapted and
re-arranged de Zayas' model to facilitate the factual analysis of forced migration
as it applies to the Bosnia-Hercegovinan conflict, especially with regard to the law
of war.
24. See infra part II.
25. See infra part III.
26. See infra part IV.
27. See infra part V.
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"Forced displacement" takes one of.two forms.2" In its direct
form, an occupying force may merely round up specific groups of
individuals, transport them to their nation's border, and force them
across.29  However, other, equally blatant methods, such as
"voluntary" resettlement, are also carried out.3"
Forced displacement can also be practiced in a more indirect,
less organized manner. This type of displacement can occur in a
region where armed conflict is on-going or where systematic human
rights violations are being committed.3 In the case of the Former
Yugoslavia, both direct and indirect methods have contributed to
the current flow of refugees.3 2 In the minds of the Bosnian Serbs,
this type of "ethnic cleansing" presents an alternative to the mass
execution of Bosnian Muslims; these mass executions are also well-
documented. Regardless of which method the perpetrator
chooses, the effect is the same: individuals or groups of individuals
are removed from their homes and Heimatslnder34 against their
28. Stavropoulou, supra note 2, at 700.
29. This is one of the favored practices in Bosnia-Hercegovina. Consider, for
instance, a 1992 account which reported that Bosnian-Serbs, forced at gun-point
loaded an entire village of about 1,800 Bosnian-Muslims on to a train bound for
Hungary. GUTMAN, supra note 10, at 20.
30. Stavropoulou, supra note 2, at 700. Such methods are also well document-
ed. One account describes how the Serb militia took control of the governmental
functions of Banja Luka, possible future capital of a Krajina Serbian enclave, and
then "offered" Muslim inhabitants exit visas. Before the visa could be obtained,
the Muslims had to sign their property over to the "state." For a $200 transporta-
tion fee, they would be transported by bus to Vlasic Mountain, at which point the
militia would rob the refugees, strip them naked, take away, rape, and kill the
younger Muslim women (". . . [t]hey could only hear the screams"), and then
chase the remaining individuals across the narrow mountain pass into a Muslim
enclave. Over several months in 1992, about 40,000 Bosnian and Croat civilians
"volunteered" to leave their homes in this manner. See GUTMAN, supra note 10,
at 120-125.
31. Stavropoulou, supra note 2, at 701. Development-induced relocation and
environmental damage can also lead to indirect migration. Id.
32. Consider, for instance, how Bosnian-Serb military forces have instilled fear
in the members of the Bosnian-Muslim population which, in turn, caused them to
abandon their towns and villages. As an example of such indirect, forced
expulsions, one report describes how, in at least one account, Bosnian-Serb
militiamen entered a village, raped and tortured several women and men in the
town square, and threatened the town's remaining population with similar
treatment unless the individuals left the town. See HELSINKI WATCH, supra note
10 and accompanying text.
33. Id.
34. Heimatsland, pl. Heimatslainder, is a difficult concept to translate. A literal
translation yields "land of one's home;" however, the literal translation does not
do justice to the term's meaning. Germany, contrary to popular opinion, remains
a very regionalized country yet today. In addition to the region where one was
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own free will. It is irrelevant for the purposes of this analysis
under which factual cloak individuals are displaced; this also
submits that criminal liability attaches once such removal is effected
no matter which methods are used to achieve this goal.
III. Forced Displacement of Bosnians under the Laws of War
The norms of criminality differ when applied to international
war or civil war. Consider, for instance, the intent of the writers of
the United Nations Charter prohibiting war across international
boundaries, but not prohibiting "insurgency, terrorism, mixed civil-
international conflict, conflict within nations divided by a cold war,
wars of unification, wars to create states where none previouslyexisted, and competition among various groups indigenous to the
sovereign."35 Therefore, before forced displacement during war
can be considered, the preliminary question of whether the Bosnian
conflict is one of international, civil, or mixed nature must be
answered. The section immediately following addresses this
question.
A. Bosnia-Hercegovina: Civil Strife, International War, or a
Mixed Conflict?
This author argues that, while there are several factors which
do support the theory that the current conflict is of a civil nature,
this war is indeed of international dimensions. 6 This argument is
based on the fact that the Bosnian conflict is the type of war which
the drafters of the United Nations Charter intended to prevent.
Consider first that Bosnia-Hercegovina is a state recognized by the
United Nations; recognition represents a key indicator of whether
a conflict is of civil or. international nature.37
raised, Heimatsland refers to the culture of one's home town and the immediate
surrounding area, to the varying degrees of friendliness of one's neighbors, and to
the cuisine and dialect one associates with having grown up in a specific region.
May it suffice to say that Heimatsland refers to everything one associates with the
location in which one lived between birth and the age of majority, while
encompassing the spirit of patriotism to the country as a whole.
35. John Norton Moore, Legal Standards for Intervention in Internal Conflicts,
13 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 191, 194 (1983). See also U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para.
7: " . . . the United Nations [may not] intervene in matters which are essentially
within the domestic jurisdiction of any state ... 
36. See Roch, supra note 11.
37. Theodor Meron, War Crimes in Yugoslavia and the Development of
International Law, 88 A.J.I.L. 78, 81 (1994).
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Second, it is clear that the successor to the Former Yugoslavia,
namely the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, comprised primarily of
Serbia and Montenegro, has aided and continues to aid the Bosnian
Serbs by providing personnel, arms, and other materials despite the
strict embargo in place around the area of fighting. 8 Such an
intrusion into the affairs of a recognized state is illegal under
conventional international law.39
Last, consider that limited multilateral intervention both from
neighboring nations and from United Nations peacekeeping forces
has provided this conflict with an international flavor.4
The first two factors alone promote this conflict within the
scope of international scrutiny. One may argue, on the other hand,
that the Bosnian conflict is not an international war, but merely
represents civil strife.41  Consider, for instance, that a small,
38. See Weller, supra note 10, at 596 and accompanying text. On May 11,
1993, Serb President Slobodan Milosevic admitted that Serbia was aiding Bosnian
Serbs. Case Concerning Application of the Convention on the Prevention of the
Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina [sic] v. Yugoslavia (Serbia and
Montenegro)), Further Requests for the Indication of Provisional Measures, 1993
I.C.J. 325 [hereinafter Response to the Second Request] (Declaration of Vice-
President Oda).
Much of the problem is enforcement of the embargo due to a lack of
resources to adequately patrol the Drina river. Barbara Crossette, U.N. Eases
Curbs on Yugoslavia After Serbian Peace Concessions, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 24, 1994,
at 1. In addition, Yugoslavia's neighbors lack the resources necessary to
effectively check trucks crossing the borders around Yugoslavia. United States
General Accounting Office, Report to the Honorable Edward M. Kennedy, U.S.
Senate, Serbia-Montenegro: Implementation of U.N. Economic Sanctions 6 (Apr.
1993). Also, several officers of the Yugoslav National Army have transferred to
the Bosnian Serb militia, both before and after recognition of Bosnia-Hercegovina
as a nation state. In fact, some officers and soldiers rotate in a tour of duty
between the Federal Yugoslav Republic's army and the Bosnian Serbs. David
Binder, Pariah as Patriot: Ratko Mladie, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 4, 1994, § 6 at 26.
39. Consider, for example, the definition of "Aggression" G.A. Res. 3314,
U.N. GAOR, 29th Sess., Supp. No. 31, at 142, U.N. Doc A/9631, art. 3, (1974) of
which states:
Any of the following acts, regardless of a declaration of war, shall,
subject to and in accordance with the provisions of Article 2, qualify as
an act of aggression:
(g) The sending by on behalf of a State of armed bands, groups,
irregulars or mercenaries, which carry out acts of armed force against
another State of such gravity as to amount to the acts [as listed in
preceding subsections], or its substantial involvement therein.
Id.
40. See Paust, supra note 20, at 507.
41. For a more detailed analysis than can be afforded here, see Charles Lewis
Nier III, Comment, The Yugoslavian Civil War: An Analysis of the Applicability
of the Laws of War Governing Non-international Armed Conflict in the Modern
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extremist Bosnian-Muslim faction, opposed to Bosnia-Hercegov-
ina's current government, is fighting next to Bosnian-Serb Sol-
diers.42 Also important is the fact that most of such crimes have
been committed within the borders of Bosnia-Hercegovina;43 most
media accounts, after close scrutiny, continue to focus on the
atrocities committed by Bosnian-Serbs against the Bosnian-Muslim
population.'
It appears, then, that the war in Bosnia-Hercegovina is neither
of international nor civil nature, but that it is a mixed conflict.
Such a conflict has been defined as a conflict which "is internal in
certain respects and international in others."45  Considering,
however, the impact that this war has had and continues to have on
many of Bosnia-Hercegovina's neighbors in terms of refugee flows
alone,' this author is convinced that Bosnia-Hercegovina's
neighboring states have a right to intervene in this conflict and that
international criminal law applies to this conflict, regardless of
whether it is labeled "international," "civil," or "mixed.
47
This conclusion is based on some precedent. Consider, for
instance, the Apartheid Convention, which declared punishable the
"dissemination of ideas based on racial superiority."48 As some
have done before, this author agrees that:
World, 10 DICK. J. INT'L L. 303 (1992).
42. See, e.g., Renate Flottau, Dies hier is kein Rambo-Film ("This is not a
Rambo movie"), DER SPIEGEL, July 4, 1994, at 118; Ruth Gordon, United Nations
Intervention in Internal Conflicts: Iraq, Somalia, and Beyond, 15 MICH. J. INT'L L.
519, at n.294; Chuck Sudetic, U.N.'s Forces Put on Alert As Serbs Advance in
Bosnia, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 21, 1994.
43. This is notwithstanding the fact that early in the conflict similar complaints
had surfaced from the Krajina, a Serb minority pocket within Croatia, and from
other border regions between the Bosnian-Muslim and Croatian territories.
44. See, e.g., GUTMAN, supra note 10 and accompanying text.
45. Michel Veuthey, Some Problems of Humanitarian Law in Noninternational
Conflicts and Guerilla Warfare, in 1 A TREATISE ON INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL
LAW 428 (M. Cherif Bassiouni & Ved P. Nanda ed., 1973) [hereinafter BASSIOUNI
& NANDA TREATISE].
46. Slovenia has admitted in about 100,000 Bosnian refugees. This number
represents five per cent of its post-independence population of two million and
presents a large burden on Slovenia's economy. Interview with Jogko tuk,
Deputy Director, Chamber of Economy of Slovenia (Aug. 1993).
47. See Schwarzenberger, International Law as Applied by International Courts
and Tribunals, in THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT (1968) (cited in BASSIOUNI &
NANDA TREATISE, supra note 45, at 428) (arguing that the distinction between
international and internal armed conflicts is an artificial one at best).
48. International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial
Discrimination, Mar. 7, 1966, 660 U.N.T.S. 195 [hereinafter Apartheid Conven-
tion].
10 DICKINSON JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol. 14:1
... if apartheid is no longer the exclusive concern of the state
of South Africa, then surely massive displacements of popula-
tion with attendant inhumanities and the high loss of life due to
exposure and starvation are also the legitimate concern of the
international community, even if such displacements occur
wholly within the borders of a sovereign state.49
In this case, the states in question are those of the Former Yugosla-
via. In addition, it has already been recognized that "individuals
have international duties which transcend the national obligations
of obedience imposed by the individual State."5 The discussion
infra, therefore, considers both possibilities of the nature of this
conflict that have been advanced supra.
B. Forced Displacement Under the Assumption that the Bosnian
Conflict is an International War
While international law, especially with regard to what has
been termed "crimes against humanity," enjoys a history which
dates back to biblical times," it appears that it was the Fourth
Hague Convention of 190752 which first manifested the idea that
states should serve the interests of humanity and conduct them-
selves according to the laws of civilized people and the laws of
humanity during times of both war and peace. 3 While it does not
specifically address forced migration, Hague IV, still in force today,
did prohibit the infliction of punishment against populations as a
whole.' Forcible migration arguably violates this provision.
49. de Zayas, supra note 23, at 253.
50. THE NUREMBERG JUDGMENT (1946) (reprinted in part in L. C. GREEN,
INTERNATIONAL LAW THROUGH THE CASES 707 (1978)).
51. Leslie C. Green, Group rights, war crimes and crimes against humanity, 1
INT'L J. GROUP RTs. 107, 107-115 (1993).
52. Regulations annexed to Convention No. IV of The Hague respecting the
Laws and Customs of War on Land, 36 Stat. 2277 (Oct. 18, 1907) [hereinafter
Hague IV].
53. Egon Schwelb, Crimes Against Humanity, 23 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 178 (H.
Lauterpacht ed., 1946).
54. Hague IV, supra note 52, art. 50, which reads:
No general penalty, pecuniary or otherwise, shall be inflicted upon the
population ....
Id. (emphasis added). Not even the Project of an International Declaration
Concerning the Laws and Customs of War recognized the illegality of the forced
deportation of individuals. Project of International Declaration Concerning the
Laws and Customs of War, 1 A.J.I.L. 96 (1907).
55. de Zayas, supra note 23, at 213.
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After World War I, violations against these laws of humanity,
both during armed conflict and during peace, were first considered
punishable,56 thereby first crystallizing in this century the concepts
of war crimes and crimes against humanity." By the beginning of
World War II, "civilized" nations had recognized the Fourth Hague
Convention as the authoritative document of the laws and customs
of war.
Before the end of World War II, especially the United States
called for punishment of Germany's offenses against the Jewish
people and other minority groups and individuals. 59 Thereafter
the treaty Which established the Nirnberg Tribunals' embodied
the distinction between war crimes and crimes against humanity.
61
War crimes, according to the Nuirnberg Treaty, included the
56. Schwelb, supra note 53, at 179.
57. Id.
58. Secretary General's Report on Aspects of Establishing an International
Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of
International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the Former
Yugoslavia, U.N. Doc. S/25704, para. 42 (May 3, 1993) (reprinted in 31 I.L.M.
1159, 1171 (1993)). Consider also the Tripartite Conference in Moscow of
November 1, 1943 (reprinted in 38 A.J.I.L. 3 (1944)):
The [signatories] [j]ointly declare:
1. That their united action, pledged for the prosecution of the war
against their respective enemies, will be. continued for the organization
and maintenance of peace and security....
Id. at 5.
59. Schwelb, supra note 53, at 186 (citing a statement made by U.S. State
Department Under-Secretary Grew.). Many other states also denounced displace-
ment at the signing of the Principles of the Atlantic Charter, 204 L.N.T.S. 381,
E.A.S. No. 236, 55 Stat. 1600, Cmd. 6321; de Zayas, supra note 23, at 213.
60. Agreement for the Prosecution and Punishment of the Major War
Criminals of the European Axis between the United States, France, Great Britain,
and the Soviet Union (reprinted in 39 A.J.I.L. 257 (1945)) [hereinafter Ntimberg
Treaty]. For purposes of this article, the author, a native of Germany, will refer
to the Treaty in its German spelling.
61. The Nfirnberg Treaty also segregated crimes against peace, which
encompassed essentially the crime of aggression. Ntlrnberg Treaty, supra note 60,
art. 6(a); see also Green, supra note 51, at 129-130.
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forcible deportation of civilian populations,6 2 and indictments
included allegations of forcible deportation.63
The 1948 Geneva Convention64 was the next document
relative to the protection of civilians in time of war. Geneva IV
generally prohibited forcible transfers of individuals and groups.
65
The Geneva Convention gave bite to this prohibition by authoriz-
ing the contracting parties to criminally enforce this prohibition. 66
62. NtIrnberg Treaty, supra note 60, art. 6(b), which reads in full:
War crimes. Namely, violations of the laws or customs of war. Such
violations shall include, but not be limited to, murder, ill treatment, or
deportation to slave labor or for any other purpose of civilian population
of or in occupied territory, murder or ill treatment of prisoners of war or
persons on the seas, killing of hostages, plunder of public or private
property, wanton destruction of cities, towns, or villages, or devastation
not justified by military necessity.
Id. (emphasis added).
63. 1 Trial of the Major War Criminals before the International Military
Tribunal 57 (1947); de Zayas, supra note 23, at 215.
64. This Convention was actually the successor to a similar treaty enacted in
1929.
65. Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time
of War of Aug. 12, 1949, T.I.A.S. No. 3396, art. 49 (1950) [hereinafter Geneva IV]
which reads:
Individual or mass forcible transfers, as well as deportations of protected
persons from occupied territory to the territory of the Occupying Power
or to that of any other country, occupied or not, are prohibited, regardless
of their motive.
Nevertheless, the Occupying Power may undertake total or partial
evacuation of a given area if the security of the population or imperative
military reasons so demand ... Persons thus evacuated shall be
transferred back to their homes as soon as hostilities in the area in
question have ceased.
[The Convention lays out minimum conditions for individuals so dis-
placed.]
The Protecting Power shall be informed of any transfers and evacuations
as soon as they have taken place.
[The Occupying Power must not detain protected persons .... 1
The Occupying Power shall not deport or transfer parts of its own civilian
population into the territory it occupies.
Id. (emphasis added).
66. Id. arts. 146-47, providing in part as follows:
146. The High Contracting Parties undertake to enact any legislation
necessary to provide effective penal sanctions for persons committing, or
ordering to be committed, any of the grave breaches of the present
Convention defined in [art. 147] ....
147. Grave breaches... shall be those involving any of the following
acts, if committed against persons or property protected by the present
Convention:... unlawful deportation or transfer.. ". of a protected person
... not justified by military necessity and carried out unlawfully and
wantonly.
Id. (emphasis added).
1995] FORCED DISPLACEMENT IN FORMER YUGOSLAVIA 13
In 1977, Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions applicable to
international armed conflicts, was signed. 67 The Protocol reiter-
ates the rule that intentional, forcible population transfers, within
the spirit of Geneva IV, constitute a grave breach against the
Convention.'
It is interesting that Protocol I also requires state actors to
"repress" grave breaches, 69 although the failure to repress such
breaches is not a grave breach itself. Therefore, it appears that no
criminal liability attaches to the failure to prevent movements of
populations if these movements are voluntary and due merely to
the general conditions of war. The language of Protocol I suggests,
therefore, that indirect types of population transfers, as distin-
guished above,70 do not fall within international criminal cul-
pability.
Contrast this reading of Protocol I with its provision that an
attack on a civilian installation is illegal if the installation is needed
to sustain civilians and if the destruction of the installation would
force the movement of the population.71 Again, it appears that
67. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 Aug. 1949, and
Relative to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol
I), art. 1(3) (June 8, 1977) (reprinted in 31 I.L.M. 1396 (1977)) [hereinafter
Protocol I].
Upon recognition, Bosnia-Hercegovina agreed to accede to all treaties to
which the Former Yugoslavia was a party. See Weller, supra note 10 and
accompanying text. This article only addresses whether these instruments form a
basis for attaching criminal liability to certain conduct. which occurred and
continues to occur during this conflict. The difficult question of whether the
Bosnian-Serb insurgents, who never recognized the new Bosnia-Hercegovina, are
to be bound by this treaty, need not be answered at this time. The ultimate
question in this article is selected criminal liability.
68. Protocol I, supra note 67, art. 85(4), which reads in part:
In addition to the grave breaches defined [above and in the Geneva
Conventions], the following shall be regarded as grave breaches of this
Protocol, when committed wilfully and in violation of the Conventions
or the Protocol:
(a) the transfer by the occupying Power of parts of its own civilian
population into the territory it occupies, or the deportation or the
deportation or transfer of all or parts of the population of the occupied
territory within or outside this territory, in violation of Article 49 of the
Fourth Convention; ...
Id. (emphasis added). For a discussion of such grave breaches see generally, L.
C. Green, Is There an International Criminal Law?, 21 ALBERTA L. REv. 251, 256
et seq. (1983).
69. Protocol I, supra note 67, art. 86(1).
70. See supra notes 31-33 and accompanying text.
71. Protocol I, supra note 67, art. 54(2) and 54(3), which reads in part:
2. It is prohibited to attack, destroy, remove or render useless objects
indispensable to the survival of [civilians], such as food-stuffs, [and
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Protocol I did not intend to include this latter type of displacement
in its provisions of conferring criminally culpable conduct.
Consider also that Protocol I, unfortunately, does not recognize the
right not to be displaced among the many fundamental rights of
persons during war.72
It is against this general background that. the International
Criminal Tribunal73 has been conferred jurisdiction res materiae to
prosecute individuals for grave breaches committed in violation of
Geneva IV and the related Protocol I, including the displacement
of civilians in an international conflict.74 Returning to Part II of
this article, it is clear that the first, direct type of forced displace-
ment is punishable as a war crime.
related items].
3. [This prohibition does not apply if the object is used to support enemy
troops].
(b) ... however, that in no event shall actions against these objects be
taken which may be expected to leave [civilians] with such inadequate
food or water as to cause its starvation or force its movement.
Id. (emphasis added).
72. Id. art. 75(2). The provision reads as follows:
The following acts are and shall remain prohibited at any time and in any
place whatsoever, whether committed by civilian or by military agents:
(a) violence to the life, health, or physical or mental well-being of
persons, in particular [murder, torture, corporal punishment, and mutila-
tion];
(b) outrages upon personal dignity, in particular humiliating and
degrading treatment, enforced prostitution and any form of indecent
assault;
(c) the taking of hostages;
(d) collective punishments; and
(e) threats to commit any of the foregoing acts.
Id.
73. United Nations: Secretary-General's Report on Aspects of Establishing an
International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious
Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the
Former Yugoslavia, U.N. Doc. S/25704 (May 3, 1993) (reprinted in 32 I.L.M. 1159
(1993) [hereinafter the International Criminal Tribunal].
74. Ntirnberg Treaty, supra note 60, art. 2:
Grave Breaches of the Geneva Conventions of 1949. The International
Tribunal shall have the power to prosecute persons committing or ordering
to be committed grave breaches of [Geneva IV], namely the following
acts against persons or property protected under the provisions of the
relevant Geneva Convention:
(g) unlawful deportation or transfer or unlawful confinement of a
civilian;
Id. (emphasis added).
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The question that arises next is whether the latter, indirect
type of forced displacement is included as a punishable crime in the
language "committing or ordering to be committed ... unlawful
deportation or transfer of a civilian""5 within the meaning of the
statute of the ad hoc Tribunal. The prosecution must argue that
the defendant knew or intended that the commission of other
human rights abuses, such as rape and torture, would cause the
local population to abandon its home village. Whether the latter,
indirect displacement does indeed fall under the category of war
crimes as envisioned by Geneva IV will be determined as a
question of fact by the International Criminal Tribunal. This
author argues that such indirect displacement should and does fall
within the definition as intended by Geneva IV, because the
language implies that the victim is moved involuntarily from his
"area of habitual residence,"76 regardless of whether he is physi-
cally moved or is chased away by fear.77
C. Forced Displacement during Civil War and as a Crime
Against Humanity
While neither the Fourth Hague Convention nor Geneva IV's
Article 49 finds application in civil war, common Article 3 of the
Geneva Convention does provide minimum humanitarian standards
which must be followed during civil war.78 Possibly because
75. Id. art. 2(g).
76. Stavropoulou, supra note 2, at 690. The term is used interchangeably with
"flight," "involuntary migration," "forced movement" or "forced migration." Id.
This author prefers and consistently applies the term "forced displacement" or
"forcible migration."
77. See supra notes 31-33 and accompanying text.
78. Geneva IV, supra note 65, art. 3, which reads in part:
In the case of armed conflict not of an international character occurring
in the territory of one of the High Contracting Parties, each Party to the
conflict shall be bound to apply, as a minimum, the following provisions:
(1) Persons taking no active part in the hostilities ... shall, in all
circumstances be treated humanely, without any adverse distinction
founded on race, colour, religion or faith, sex, birth or wealth, or any
other similar criteria.
To this end, the following acts remain prohibited at any time and in
any place whatsoever with respect to the above-mentioned persons:
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Article 3 is the result of compromise,79 it does not specifically
include forced displacement as a crime. However, one may
consider whether forcible displacement of civilians falls within the
wording of "outrages upon personal dignity, in particular humiliat-
ing and degrading treatment" as set forth by Article 3(1)(b) of
Geneva IV." In either case, other conflicts subsequent to the
enactment of Geneva IV have shown that Article 3 does not attach
criminal liability of any sort on actors who violate its provisions."
More expressive is Protocol II of 1977 which supplements
Article 3 of Geneva IV,' Article 17 of Protocol II expressly
prohibits the forcible displacement of civilians during civil war. 3
As applied to the Bosnian conflict, Article 17 provides interesting
complications for the prosecution.
First, Bosnian Serb defendants, especially heads of local police,
can make convincing arguments that the displacement of Bosnian
Muslims is for the security of the civilians involved. Had they not
been moved, so they might argue, the local militia or other civilians
might have harmed them." In addition, the provisions that the so
moved individuals must be received under "satisfactory" conditions
is subject to wide interpretation and will become a question of fact
for the International Criminal Tribunal.
Second, Article 17 states that no such displacement shall be
ordered. If strictly interpreted, this would mean that if a group of
individuals leaves its home village because of other human rights
abuses committed there, no punishable act on behalf of the
79. Charles Lysaght, The Scope of Protocol II and its Relation to Common
Article 3 of the Geneva Convention of 1949 and other Human Rights Instruments,
33 AM. U.L. REV. 9, 11 (1983).
80. Geneva IV, supra note 65, art. 3(1)(b).
81. Veuthey, supra note 45, at 445.
82. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 Aug. 1949, and
relating to the protection of victims in non-international armed conflicts (June 8,
1977), art 1(1) (reprinted in 16 I.L.M. 1442 (1977)) [hereinafter Protocol II].
83. Id. art. 17, which reads:
1. The displacement of the civilian population shall not be ordered for
reasons related to the conflict unless the security of the civilians involved
or imperative military reasons so demand. Should such displacements
have to be carried out, all possible measures shall be taken in order that
the civilian population may be received under satisfactory conditions of
shelter, hygiene, health, safety and nutrition.
2. Civilians shall not be compelled to leave their own territory for
reasons connected with the conflict.
Id. (emphasis added).
84. This argument has already been enunciated by local military and police
commanders. See GUTMAN, supra note 10, at 121.
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occupant has taken place because the occupant did not order the
population to leave. In essence, only the first, direct type of
displacement, as indicated earlier, would fall under the prohibitive
scope of Protocol H1.85 If this is, indeed, the intent of the drafters
of Protocol II, then the prosecutor of the International Criminal
Tribunal would have to rely on Geneva IV's Article 1(2) and could
only try those individuals whose violations against humanitarian law
have caused Bosnian Muslims to flee. This is a causative link
which will be factually difficult to establish: did the defendant's acts
cause the victim's flight, or did the victim cross the border to
escape the generally adverse conditions of war? Again, this
represents a factual question for the Tribunal and leaves room for
many of the defendants' explanations.
The third difficulty, however, is much more fundamental in
nature than the two. supra. Regardless of the strength of the
language which prohibits forced displacement, the drafters never
intended either Article 3 of Geneva IV or Protocol II to include
criminal implications for the actors in question.16 The only argu-
ment left for the prosecution is as follows: since Protocol II
includes so many affirmative imperatives and "prohibits" certain
types of behavior during civil war, criminal liability must attach in
order to enforce the prohibitions contained in Protocol II.
If, thus, this conflict is determined to be one of civil nature and
if Geneva IV and Protocol II cannot be used as means to prosecute
the forced displacement of the Bosnian Muslim population, one
must turn to a body of natural laws which is more general in
application than the rules of war, namely the body of crimes against
humanity.
During World War II, Germany's enemies, including Yugosla-
via, after having recognized Germany's intent "to exterminate the
Jewish people in Europe, 8 7 almost declared that Germany's
transport of Jews to Eastern Europe constituted a crime against
humanity which deserved punishment. 8 Some writers of the time
85. Protocol II, supra note 82, art. 17, para. 2 is of no help, as the phrase
"shall not be compelled" is not defined in the Protocol and is thereby open to the
argument that no compulsion has taken place. Id.
86. See, e.g., Leslie C. Green, Lecture at the Univ. of Denver (April 24, 1995);
see supra text accompanying note 81.
87. Schwelb, supra note 53, at 184.
88. Hansard, 385 PARL. DEB., H.C. (5th ser.) 2083 (1942) (cited in Schwelb,
supra note 53, at 184); the declaration reads:
From all the occupied countries Jews are being transported ... to
Eastern Europe .... [The governments of Belgium, Czechoslovakia,
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included crimes against humanity as a subpart of war crimes which
served as a catch-all in case the defendant nation had committed
acts which do not fall under the broader category of war crimes."
This author cannot agree that, in 1995, crimes against humani-
ty, including the crime of forcible transfer of populations, are
inherently non-separable from war crimes, i.e. that in order for the
prosecution of a crime against humanity to be possible, a war of
international dimension must either concurrently occur or subse-
quently have occurred. In reading the plain language of the
Nirnberg Treaty, it is obvious that the Treaty condemned the
crime of deportation,9' if committed during war as a crime against
humanity, practically in the same breath that it Condemned such
crime if committed while at peace before international war.91
Indeed, forcible displacement was included in the Niirnberg
indictments: "the International Military Tribunal was unequivocal
in its condemnation of mass expulsions as a crime against humani-
ty."92 In addition, the United Nations has extended the applica-
tion of crimes against humanity to crimes committed during
Greece, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, the United
States of America, the United Kingdom, the Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics, Yugoslavia, and the French National Committee] condemn in
the strongest possible terms this bestial policy of cold-blooded extermina-
tion [and] reaffirm their solemn resolution that those responsible for
these crimes shall not escape retribution and to press on with the
necessary practical measures to this end.
Id. (emphasis added).
89. See Schwelb, supra note 53, at 206:
[The crime against humanity] is, as it were, a kind of by-product of war,
applicable only in time of war or in connection with war and destined
primarily, if not exclusively, to protect the inhabitants of foreign countries
against crimes committed in connection with an aggressive war, by the
authorities and organs of the aggressor state [and] serves to cover cases
not covered by norms forming part of the traditional "laws and customs
of war."
Id. (emphasis added). See also Green, supra note 51, at 131.
90. Nirnberg Treaty, supra note 60, art. 6(c), which reads in full:
Crimes against humanity. Namely, murder, extermination, enslavement,
deportation, and other inhumane acts committed against any civilian
population before or during the war or persecutions on political, racial,
or religious grounds in execution of or in connection with any crime
within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal, whether or not in violation of
domestic law of the country where perpetrated.
Id. (emphasis added).
91. Id. For a discussion of the difficulty faced by the tribunal to incorporate
pre-war atrocities under its res materiae, see Green, supra note 51, at 130.
92. See, e.g., de Zayas, supra note 23, at 214-216.
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peace.93 If crimes against humanity can be committed during
peaceful times and during international wars, then surely crimes
against humanity must also be punishable if they are committed
during civil war. Most significantly, the Niirnberg Treaty recog-
nized that, given an international treaty to that effect, crimes
against humanity are punishable despite the fact that such crimes
might have been legal under municipal law.94 Again this implies
that, under certain conditions, the immunity of the sovereign may
be pierced and that he may be punished if found guilty of egregious
acts.95
IV. Other International Instruments and Forced Displacement
as an International Crime
A. The Genocide Convention
As an example of how certain acts are punishable during
international war, civil war, or peace, consider, for instance, the
Genocide Convention,96 written immediately before the Geneva
Conventions.97 The Genocide Convention, unfortunately, does
93. Consider, for instance, the applicability of the Genocide Convention in this
context, see infra note 96. The same applies to the Apartheid Convention, supra
note 48.
94. Consider the last phrase of art. 6(c) of the Nirmberg Treaty, supra note 60:
.. . whether or not in violation of domestic law of the country were perpetrated."
Id.
95. See, e.g., George A. Finch, The Nuremberg Trial and International Law,
41 A.J.I.L. 20 (1947):
It is accepted in international law, conventional, as well as customary,
that a belligerent has authority to try and punish individuals for crimes
which constitute violations of the laws and customs of war, as well as of
the laws of humanity, when such persons fall within his power.
Id. at 21 (emphasis added). But c.f. Supreme Court Judgment in Cases Concern-
ing Deportation Orders, 29 I.L.M. 140 (1990) (in which the Israeli Supreme Court
rejected the application of Geneva IV, discussed below, in time of "peace").
96. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide,
78 U.N.T.S. 277 (Dec. 9, 1948), art. I [hereinafter Genocide Convention], which
reads:
The Contracting Parties confirm that genocide, whether committed in time
of peace or in time of war, is a crime under international law which they
undertake to prevent and to punish.
Id. (emphasis added).
97. The Former Yugoslavia is a party to the Genocide Convention. See supra
note 67 and accompanying text for a brief discussion on state succession and treaty
obligations.
Even if the Former Yugoslavia were not party to the Genocide Convention,
it is recognized that genocide is a crime under customary international law. See
Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to Paragraph 2 of Security Council
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not specifically make the forced displacement of individuals a
crime; instead, it focuses on the elimination and persecution of
groups of individuals.9"
While some distinguished writers take the application of the
Genocide Convention to the forced displacement of peoples as a
given," it is the author's opinion that application of the Genocide
Convention to the crime of forced movement of people requires
much closer scrutiny. It is respectfully submitted, therefore, that
Judge Lauterpacht, in a recent opinion of the International Court
of Justice, overlooks many of the problematic causative links given
the indirect nature of the way in which forced displacement has
often been effected in Bosnia-Hercegovina.
Resolution 808, U.N.S.C. Doc. S/25704, para. 35 (1993) (reprinted in 32 I.L.M. 1163
(1993)).
98. Genocide Convention, supra note 96, art. II, which reads:
In the present Convention, genocide means any of the following acts
committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethical,
racial or religious group, as such:
(a) Killing members of the group;
(b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group
(c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to
bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part;
(d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group;
(e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group.
Id.
99. See, e.g., Response to the Second Request, supra note 38, at para. 69
(Lauterpacht, J., separate opinion) which states:
... The evidence also indicates plainly that, in particular, the forced
migration of civilians, more commonly known as "ethnic cleansing," is,
in truth, part of a deliberate campaign by the Serbs to eliminate Muslim
control of, and presence in, substantial parts of Bosnia-Hercegovina. Such
being the case, it is difficult to regard the Serbian acts as other than acts
of genocide in that they clearly fall within categories (a), (b) and (c) [sic]
of the definition of genocide quoted above, they are clearly directed
against an ethnical or religious group as such, and they are intended to
destroy that group, if not in whole certainly in part, to the extent
necessary to ensure that group no longer occupies the parts of Bosnia-
Hercegovina coveted by the Serbs....
Id. (emphasis added). See also Judge Ajibola's separate opinion, which provides
even less analysis of the application of the genocide convention with regard to
ethnic cleansing, the forced displacement of Bosnian Muslims:
[In the April 8, 1993, judgment, the Court] reaffirmed its condemnation
of all "violations" of international humanitarian law and "ethnic
cleansing" in particular. Both the Court and the Security Council have
taken steps, I believe, to stop the ongoing genocide in Bosnia.
Response to the Second Request, supra note 38 (Ajibola, J., separate opinion).
The author acknowledges that it is possible the Judge did so for purposes of
expediency.
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The first problem arises in the definition of a "group" within
the meaning of the Genocide Convention. Most writers in this field
rely on the plain meaning of the word "group;""' this author
prefers to apply the definition of a "community" as set forth by
Permanent Court of International Justice in 1930.101 Considering
that the Bosnian Muslims practice their own religion, preserve their
own tradition (for example food preparation), and are distinguish-
able by their last names from Bosnian Serbs, it is of little question
that the Bosnian Muslims fall under the Permanent Court of
International Justice's definition of community, and as such, should
be considered a "group" within the meaning of the Genocide
Convention.10 2
Once that hurdle is overcome, the second arises as follows:
does forced migration fall under any of the five factors set forth by
the Genocide Convention? First, forced displacement surely cannot
be equated with killing,' °3 as is advanced by Judge Lauter-
pacht."°4 Second, while systematic rape with the intent to pro-
duce pregnancy should be construed as a measure intended to
"prevent births within the group"'0" for the duration of the
pregnancy, forcible displacement could not be considered such a
measure, unless the prosecution could factually argue that the
conditions imposed upon Bosnian Muslim women during the forced
migration from their Heimat to other locations are so severe in
100. See, e.g., Webb, supra note 20, at n.99.
101. Interpretation of the Convention Between Greece and Bulgaria Respecting
Reciprocal Emigration (Question of the "Communities"), Section B, No. 17 (July
31, 1930). Accordingly, "community" is defined as
... a group of persons living in a given country or locality, having race,
religion, language and traditions of their own, and united by [those
factors] in a sentiment of solidarity, with a view to preserving their
traditions, maintaining their form of worship, securing the instruction and
upbringing of their children in accordance with the spirit and traditions
of their race and mutually assisting one another.
Id.
102. Here, Judge Ajibola asks the correct question: "Who are the 'Bosnian
people"'? Response to the Second Request, supra note 38 (Ajibola, J., separate
opinion). He asks the question in the context which has been raised above, supra
notes 93-95 with respect to the application of international law to an internal
matter:
Furthermore, the questions whether the issue of genocide as provided for
in Article I of the Convention is not exclusively a matter for the States
which "undertake to prevent and to punish" it.
Id.
103. Genocide Convention, supra note 96, art II(a).
104. See supra note 99 and accompanying text.
105. Genocide Convention, supra note 96, art. 11(d).
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terms of lack of sanitation and food that no children can be carried
to term. Third, some accounts exist of Bosnian Muslim children
being transferred1" to Serb orphanages in order to "spare" them
from the horrors of war.1 7 At this stage, however, such accounts
are probably isolated and are not orchestrated on a scale sufficient-
ly large to be considered genocide within the meaning of the
Convention.
However, forced displacement is likely to represent a deliber-
ately inflicted condition which is calculated to bring about the
group's partial or entire physical destruction." The difficulty of
proof arises in questions of whether the forced displacement of
individuals from areas which have a Bosnian-Serb and Bosnian-
Muslim mix to enclaves which are entirely Muslim constitutes
destruction of the group. In cases in which the Bosnian Muslims
are joined with others of their faith in different parts of Bosnia-
Hercegovina, such argument will be a difficult one for the prosecu-
tion to make because the procreation of the Muslim population is
not impeded. However, when expelled into territories outside
Bosnia-Hercegovina, which may or may not have large Bosnian-
Muslim populations, such displacement could bring about the
destruction of the group or parts thereof."° In either case, such
displacement most certainly causes the destruction of the communi-
ty as defined by the Permanent Court; whether a Muslim group
within a mixed village constitutes a separate group will have to be
determined by the International Criminal Tribunal as a question of
fact.
Applying the remaining factor of the Genocide Convention,
the fact that forced migration causes "serious bodily or mental
harm" ' ° is undisputed. The psychological harm of becoming a
refugee alone satisfies the Convention's language, and need no
further discussion here.
The largest difficulty for the prosecution will arise, however,
when attempting to resolve the Genocide Convention's mens rea
requirements which precede the provisions of Article 2 of the
Convention as outlined here. The acts enumerated as crimes
106. Id. art. II(e).
107. Anna-Patricia Kahn, Wo sind die bosnischen Kinder? (Where are the
Bosnian children?), Focus, May 16, 1994, at 108.
108. Genocide Convention, supra note 96, art. II(c).
109. Consider the attempted expulsion to Hungary, supra note 29 and
accompanying text.
110. Genocide Convention, supra note 96, art. II (b).
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therein must be committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in
part, the group."' It is submitted that a sufficiently large part of
the Bosnian Muslim population has been affected by the population
transfer to constitute a "part" within the definition of the Genocide
Convention, 112 thereby satisfying the actus reus component of the
crime of genocide. The prosecution must, nevertheless, show that
the defendants, when displacing the parts of the group, did so with
the intent to destroy at least a part of the group. If the defendants
can convince the Tribunal that they displaced certain Bosnian
Muslims in order to gain territory, not in order to destroy this part
of the group, the prosecution may not be able to meet its burden
of proof as it applies to the mens rea requirement set out in the
Genocide Convention. Again, Judge Lauterpacht's separate
opinion appears to entirely ignore this mens rea requirement, unless
the Judge in his mind "bootstrapped" an inferred intent based on
the presently documented results while writing his opinion.
Consider additionally the complexity which arises from the
earlier question of whether indirect forced displacement would be
covered under any criminal provisions."' In this case, the prose-
cution must prove that the defendants intentionally committed
violations against human rights after full deliberation and expecta-
tion that such violations would result in the indirect flight of
individuals from Bosnia-Hercegovina, the end objective of which
remaining the physical destruction of the group. As is obvious
from this construction, the Genocide Convention, as applied to
forced displacement, provides a very difficult burden of proof for
the prosecutors of the International Tribunal and again presents a
very long causative link that may be difficult to establish at trial.
B. Other Treaties
Once the possibility for the attachment of criminal responsibil
ity under the Genocide Convention is exhausted, one must turn to
other documents. Consider, for instance, Protocol IV"4 to the
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
111. Id. art. II.
112. For analysis of what constitutes a "part," see text accompanying note 40.
See also GUTMAN, supra note 10, at 107.
113. See supra notes 31-33 and accompanying text.
114. Protocol No. 4 to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms, Securing Certain Rights and Freedoms Other than Those
Already Included in the Convention and in the First Protocol thereto, Sept. 16,
1963, E.T.S. 46 (May 2, 1968) [hereinafter Protocol IV].
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Freedoms."5 Although the Former Yugoslavia is not a signatory,
some believe that the Protocol's provisions are rapidly emerging as
jus cogens."6 Protocol IV does provide for a right not to be ex-
pelled.1 7 Nonetheless, the Convention does not make conduct
contrary to its intent criminal and, therefore, serves only as a
limited means for prosecutorial purposes; it merely establishes,
among the signatory nations, a person's right not to be displaced.
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights does provide that
"[n]o one shall be subjected to arbitrary arrest, detention or [sic]
exile."' 8 Similar problems arise with these provisions in regard
to forced displacement. First, placement into "exile" typically
means the physical and documentary expatriation -from one's
homeland, commonly in the context of punishment for a criminal
act. "Exile" does not include a person's removal from his Heimat
if his new habitat is within his patria. Second, no criminality
attaches to the one who acts violating this directive.
No better is the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights." 9 This document merely recognizes a citizen's right to re-
enter his home country." While other specific provisions recog-
nize a civil right of action, no guilt attaches to a state actor who
denies a citizen entry. This analysis applies only when one
overcomes the linguistic difficulties of equating the right to return
with the right not to be expelled.
C. The Proposed Draft Code of Crimes Against the Peace and
Security of Mankind
However, one document in draft form may be the first to
directly address forced displacement. The Draft Code of Offenses
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116. See, e.g., de Zayas, supra note 23, at 245.
117. Protocol IV, supra note 114, art. 3, which reads:
1. No one shall be expelled, by means either of an individual or of a
collective measure, from the territory of the State of which he is a
national.
Id.
118. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, U.N. GAOR, 3rd Sess., art. 9,
U.N. Doc. A/810, at 71 (Dec. 10, 1948) [hereinafter Declaration].
119. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 999 U.N.T.S. 171
(1976).
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right to enter his own country."
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against the Peace and Security of Mankind contains provisions
against the forced displacement of persons1 and somewhat
parallels the language of Article 6(c) of the Nurnberg Tribunal's
statute.' 22
Marginally better is the most recently proposed Draft Code of
Crimes Against the Peace and Security of Mankind.1" The Draft
Code is, of course, part of neither conventional nor customary
international law and, therefore, would not, even if agreed upon by
all nations, be made applicable to the war in Bosnia-Hercegovina
according to the principle of nullum crimen, nulla poena sine
lege. 24 However, the Draft Code does provide for the crime of
forcible transfer of populations."2 On the other hand, the most
severe flaw of the entire Draft Code rests in its vagueness and in
its lack of definitions."2 In addition, the relevant provision
contains no temporal or contextual limitation. 27 It is, therefore,
unlikely that any nation will agree to this very strict provision,
128
which would, under its narrow reading, include as a crime the
evacuation of individuals from disaster areas if the evacuation is
against the individual's will.
121. Draft Code of Offenses against the Peace and Security of Mankind, art.
2(10), 45 AJ.I.L. 123, 130 (Supp. 1951), which reads as follows:
2. The following acts are offenses against the peace and security of
mankind:
(10) Inhuman acts by the authorities of a State or by private
individuals against any civilian population, such as murder, or extermina-
tion, or enslavement or deportation.
Id. (emphasis added).
122. See supra note 90 and accompanying text.
123. [Hereinafter Draft Code] (reprinted in COMMENTARIES ON THE
INTERNATIONAL LAW COMMISSION'S 1991 DRAFT CODE OF CRIMES AGAINST
THE PEACE AND SECURITY OF MANKIND (M. Cherif Bassiouni ed., 1993)
[hereinafter COMMENTARIES ON DRAFT CODE]).
124. See, e.g., Finch, supra note 95.
125. Draft Code, supra note 123, art. 21, which reads:
Systematic or Mass Violations of Human Rights. An individual who
commits or orders the commission of any of the following violations of
human rights:
d eportation or forcible transfer of population shall, on conviction
thereof, be sentenced [to... ].
Id.
126. See, e.g., Albin Eser, The Need for a General Part, in COMMENTARIES ON
THE DRAFT CODE, supra note 123, at 43.
127. Paul Peters, COMMENTARIES ON THE DRAFT CODE, supra note 123.
128. Id.
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In addition, this article only applies to transfers of populations.
It does not address the transfer of groups or individuals, thereby
imposing an even higher burden of proof on a prosecutor than does
the Genocide Convention, under which mere partial destruction of
a group must be proven.
V. Conclusions and Observations
Based on the above analyses, it appears that the crime of
forced displacement has been accepted unconditionally only in
circumstances of international warfare. A tribunal's ability to
attach criminal culpability to actors who practice forcible migration
in civil wars, on the other hand, is very, context specific. Even
under strongly worded instruments such as the Genocide Conven-
tion, prosecutorial possibilities of forced migration as an interna-
tional crime are severely limited due to the Convention's limited
factual application and its severely restrictive mens rea require-
ments.
The question which remains to be answered is the following:
given its limited application, is compulsory migration a delictum
juris gentium?129 One treatise presents the evolution of a crime
under international law in the following five steps." First,
internationally shared values emerge. Second, such values are
declared as specific human rights in an international document.
Third, the right manifests itself in a binding convention. Fourth,
means to enforce the right are enunciated, prohibiting conduct
which runs afoul of the right. Last, international penal law is
prescribed to punish acts contrary to the right.131
By applying these factors to the forcible displacement of
individuals and of groups of people, it appears that the values as
described under the first criterion have clearly emerged, considering
their recognition in instruments such as Geneva IV. The fourth
criterion also appears to be met in that .Geneva IV and its two
Protocols positively prohibit the forced deportation of civilians.
Geneva IV and Protocol I even satisfy the fifth and final element
129. In the sense as used in Attorney General of Israel v. Eichmann, 36 Int'l.
L. Rep. 5 (Israel, Dist. Ct. Jerusalem 1961) (reprinted in part in M. Cherif
Bassiouni, Genocide and Racial Discrimination, 1 TREATISE ON INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL LAW 528 (M. Cherif Bassiouni ed., 1986)).
130. M. Cherif Bassiouni, Characteristics of International Criminal Law
Conventions, in 1 TREATISE ON INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW, supra note 129,
at 16.
131. Id.
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of the developmental process of international crimes as described
above,32 in that both instruments seek to criminally punish those
engaging in forced migration.
However, it appears that the drafters of such instruments have
disregarded steps two and three of the framework outlined above.
In none of the international documents discussed in this article has
the right not to be displaced ever been formally recognized.133
Even the Refugee Convention of 1951," as amended by its
Protocol,"'3 while it recognizes the plight of displaced peoples,
136
does not recognize an individual's right not to become a refugee.
Similar appear the provisions of the Declaration, 3 7 in which its
drafters have chosen imperative language instead of expressing a
right not to be placed in exile, as compared to, for instance, the
right to movement within a state's borders, 3 the right to leave
and to return to one's country,'39 and the right to nationality."
The same applies to the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights. 4'
In this failure to recognize such a right rests the basic difficulty
of forced displacement as a crime. Consider, for instance, that
while the Allied Powers quickly included forced deportation of
German nationals as a crime against humanity for the purposes of
the Ntirnberg trials, these same Powers contracted with Poland and
Czechoslovakia to remove ethnic Germans from Polish and
Czechoslovakian territories. 42  Again, this author does not
132. Although not all conduct which is unlawful is also criminal. See Krypton
Weiss, The Limits for the Prosecution of Crimes against International Law, 1982
BRr. Y.B. INT'L L. 171, 172 (Brownlie and Bonett eds., 1982).
133. After sixty pages of analysis, one advocate of the recognition of such a
right finally acknowledges that the right not to be displaced is merely "implicit"
under current international law. Stavropoulou, supra note 2, at 749.
134. Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, July 28, 1951, 189 U.N.T.S.
137 (1951) [hereinafter Refugee Convention].
135. Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, Jan. 31, 1967, 606 U.N.T.S.
267 (1967).
136. Refugee Convention, supra note 134, at preamble.
137. Compared with other provisions within the Declaration which specifically
provide rights to individuals, such as art. 13 (1), "[e]veryone has the right to
freedom of movement and residence within the borders of each state."
Declaration, supra note 118, art. 13(1).
138. Id.
139. Id. art. 13(2).
140. Id. art. 15(1).
141. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 119.
142. Protocol of Proceedings of the Berlin Conference, art. 12 (Aug. 2, 1945)
(reprinted in G. C. PAIKERT, THE GERMAN EXODUs 8 (1962)) [hereinafter
Potsdam Agreement].
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attempt to equate Germany's atrocities against Jews, gypsies, and
other groups with the post-bellum displacement of ethnic Germans;
however, the point is clear: the unconditional right not to be
displaced is not manifested in international law; its criminal
punishment depends on the party in power who carries out the
punishment of the criminal.
In addition, the example of the ethnic Germans may be
transposed to the war in Bosnia-Hercegovina. Assuming, arguendo,
that the Bosnian Muslims succeed and win the war against the
Bosnian Serbs, may the Bosnian Muslims, under the eyes and with
the blessings of the United Nations, move the Serbian populations
back to the new Serbia to be united with their own kind in order
to satisfy desires of retribution as was the case in Germany?143
Surely the answer-must be negative.
Perhaps the right not to be displaced has not been recognized
in international law because an individual's true origin cannot be
defined. Where is the home from which expulsion takes place;
which should be recognized as the native land of a man? Does
Heimat refer to an individual's village, to his property, to the
physical, cultural, and religious setting in which he was born, grew
up, or lived for most of his life, or to his patria?'"
If such preliminary questions of rights which underlie interna-
tional criminal law cannot be answered, is it facile to conclude that
international criminal law itself does not exist.'45 The application
of criminal law to the Bosnian situation with respect to forced
displacement of people does appear to be limited.
Such limitations become apparent when one examines the
indictments issued so far by the prosecutor of the International
Criminal Tribunal.' 6 None of these indictments includes charges
of the forcible transfer of Bosnian Muslims; most of the charges
concentrate on murder, torture, and rape.147 A related question
143. See ZOLTAN MICHAEL SzAz, GERMANY'S EASTERN FRONTIERS 109-110
(1960) (cited in PAIKERT, supra note 142, at 19).
144. PAIKERT, supra note 142, at 51.
145. See The Problem of an International Criminal Law, 3 CURRENT LEGAL
PROBLEMS 263, 295 (1950) (cited in John Murphy, International Crimes (2 UNITED
NATIONS LEGAL ORDER 993 (Oscar Schachter & Christopher C. Joyner eds.,
1995))).
146. Indictments against Tadid, Borovnica, Meakid, Kvocka, Prad, Radid, Kos,
Gruban, Govedarica, Gruban, Kostic, Paspalj, Pavlic, Popvid, Predojevid, Savid,
Babid, Jajic, Knezevid, Saponja, Zigic, and Nikolid, The International Criminal
Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (Nov. 8, 1994) (on file with author).
147. Id.
FORCED DISPLACEMENT IN FORMER YUGOSLAVIA
concerns enforcement.14 So far, only one of the named defen-
dants, namely Dugko Tadid, is in the international prosecutor's
custody, after a month-long battle with Germany for his extradi-
tion. It is questionable whether the others will ever be arrested to
stand trial.149
While these limitations are inherent in global efforts to bring
about justice in retribution for acts of forced displacement
committed in the past and in deterrence of future acts, this author
submits that the present law with respect to forced migration is
better than no law at all. Such crimes should be recognized soon,
because crimes of the nature of World War II, i.e. full-scale,
international wars, are, in this age of nuclear devices, wars of the
past. On the other hand, civil wars, such as the ones on-going in
Bosnia-Hercegovina, Rwanda, and many other locations, are the
wars of today and of the future. All nations must recognize,
prevent, and punish the crime of forcible displacement of individu-
als, groups, and peoples in order to deter "small" parties, fighting
civil wars, from committing this crime. The Refugee Convention
of 1951 addresses states' obligations to the victims of forced
migration; the international legal community must find means with
which to punish the victims' tormentors.
148. Thomas J. Murphy, Sanctions and Enforcement of the Humanitarian Law
of the Four Geneva Conventions of 1949 and Geneva Protocol I of 1977, 103 MIL.
L. REV. 3 (1984). Yet another question is that of jurisdiction of the Tribunal. On
general principles, see Geoff Gilbert, Crimes sans Frontieres: Jurisdictional
Problems in English Law, 1992 BRrr. Y.B. INT'L L. 415 (Brownlie and Bonett eds.,
1982).
149. Notwithstanding the "super-indictment" procedure of Article 61 of the
Tribunal's statute. On multi-national enforcement, see M. Cherif Bassiouni, Policy
Considerations on Interstate Cooperation in Criminal Matters, 4 PACE Y.B. INT'L
L. 123 (1992).
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